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CURRENT LEGISLATION
so necessary to public health and welfare-to the maintenance of the
very government which is responsible for the enforcement of the
right to strike wherever possible and proper.
JOHN MAHON,
Louis MELE.
PLEADING AND PRAcTIcE-BRINGING ADDITIONAL PARTIES INTO
AN AcTION.-The principles of adjective law concerning the bringing
of additional parties into an action have been radically changed.
Chapter 971 of the Laws of 1946, effective September 1, 1946,
amended five of the sections of the Civil Practice Act dealing with
this subject 1 One section was completely repealed 2 and several sec-
tions added in its place.3 The necessary Rules of Civil Practice have
been amended as well.4 The legislation was enacted as recommended
by the Judicial Council.5 The recommendation had been fortified
by an excellent and exhaustive analysis of the defects of the law of
New York prior to the enactments, the need for the amendments,
and a detailed account of what would be accomplished by the new
legislation.6
A. Addition of Parties Indispensable and Conditionally
Necessary
Parties are now classified as proper, conditionally necessary, and
indispensable. The former term "necessary parties" has been sub-
divided. Confusion occasioned by decisional law as to what was
meant by a "necessary party" has been eliminated. A person whose
absence will prevent an effective determination of the controversy
or whose interests are not severable and would be inequitably affected
by a judgment rendered between the parties before the court, is an
indispensable party; a person who is not an indispensable party but
who ought to be a party if complete relief is to be accorded between
those already parties is a conditionally necessary party.7 The ter-
I N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr §§ 180, 192, 264, 278, 474. The amendments to
Sections 264 and 474 are not here discussed. They merely transpose the pro-
visions of the repealed Section 193 (2) to those sections where they logically
belong. Section 192 (2) related to cross claims by the impleaded party against
the original plaintiff.
2 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 193 prior to 1946 amendment
3 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 193-a, 193-b, 193-c. § 193-c is not here discussed.
It is merely the former 193 (5) transposed.
4 N. Y. RuLEs OF Civ. PRAc., 102, 105, 54.
5 12 REP. JUDICIAL CouNciL. (1946) 43-47.
6 Ibid. pp. 163-236.
7 N. Y. Civ. Pagc. Acr § 193 (1).
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minology used is similar to that employed in the federal courts.8
The effect of a failure to join each of these types of parties has
been specifically provided for:
1. When an indispensable party has not been joined, the court
must order such party brought in; if a party fails or neglects to
bring in an indispensable party after a reasonable period granted to
him to do so, the court shall dismiss the action without prejudice.9
The dismissal follows necessarily from the definition of an indis-
pensable party, i.e., one without whom the court cannot proceed. The
fact that the dismissal is without prejudice precludes any possibility
of an illogical decision that the controversy has been settled on the
merits between those who were parties and is therefore res judicata.
The provision that no action or special proceeding shall be defeated
by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties 10 has been amended to
avoid possible conflict and now reads that there shall be no such
dismissal except as provided in Section 193.
2. When it appears that a conditionally necessary party has
not been joined, the court must order such party to be brought in
if he is subject to the jurisdiction of the court and can be brought
in without undue delay; the court in its discretion may proceed in
an action without a conditionally necessary party if his addition would
cause undue delay or if the jurisdiction can be acquired only by his
consent or voluntary appearance.12  If a party fails or neglects to
bring in a conditionally necessary party after a reasonable period
granted to him to do so, the court may in its discretion dismiss the
action, once again without prejudice.'8
The provisions of the new section have been made expressly
applicable to all actions whether formerly denominated legal or equi-
table.14 Decisional law bad applied the prior statute ' 5 only to actions
which were formerly denominated equitable.18
Objections of a party that a pleading showed on its face either
(a) that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff or (b) that there
was a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant, were formerly waived
unless taken by timely motion.1 The objection that there is a non-
joinder or misjoinder of parties is now raised by a motion to add or
8 FED. P. CIV. P., 19-20.
9 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 193 (2).
'ON. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 192 prior to 1946 amendment.
12 Ibid. as amended. ,
12 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 193 (2).
23 Ibid.
14 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 193 (3).
25 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 193 (1) prior to 1946 amendment.
26 Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 532, 26 N. E. 3 (1890); Gittleman v.
Feltman, 191 N. Y. 205, 208, 83 N. E. 969 (1908).1 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 278 prior to 1946 amendment.
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drop parties.' 8 If there has been a nonjoinder, the court may stay
all proceedings in the action until its order to bring in the additional
party has been complied with. 19
B. Impleader
"The procedural device alternately called impleader or third-
party practice permits a party to an action against whom a claim is
being asserted to bring in an additional party for the purpose of de-
termining in a single proceeding not only the claim asserted in the
original action, but also a related claim against the added party." 20
The beneficial results of such a procedural device are obvious.
The commonweal is promoted by avoidance of several separate suits,
and one presentation of evidence suffices to dispose of the several
claims. The litigant who impleads is aided in avoidance of circuity
of action and multiplicity of suits. The chief benefit to the implead-
ing party is that since all claims are litigated in the same trial before
the same trier of facts, there can be no inconsistency in the results
of the adjudication of the' primary claim against him and his claim
over against the impleaded party.
The new impleader statute21 is entitled "Third-party practice."
A defendant, after he has answered the original complaint, may bring
in a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.22 Similarly a
plaintiff against whom a counterclaim has been asserted may bring
in a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of such counterclaim.23  In either case, the impleader
is commenced by service of a summons and copy of a verified com-
plaint on the third party (denominated as the "third-party defen-
dant") by the impleading party (denominated as the "third-party
plaintiff") as to the claim over.24
The terms "third-party plaintiff" and "third-party defendant"
are new to the Civil Practice Act and will bring refreshing clarity
to the subject. The third-party plaintiff need no longer apply to the
18 N. Y. RuLEs OF Civ. Prec., 102 (2).
'19 Ibid.
20 12 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1946) 192. As is there pointed out "The
remedy of 'impleader' . . . should not be confused with the remedy of 'inter-
pleader' provided in Sections 285-287 of the Civil Practice Act. 'Interpleader'
is a procedure for the determination of adverse claims made against the same
person. In 'impleader,' on the other hand, there are no adverse claims to be
settled, but rather the primary liability of the original defendant for the claim
made by the plaintiff, and the alleged 'liability over' of the third party defen-
dant, are to be settled in one proceeding."
21N . Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 193-a.
22N. Y. Civ. P-Ac. ACT § 193-a (1).
23 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 193-a (6).
24 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 193-a (1).
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court for leave to bring in the third-party defendant, as was neces-
sary under the prior law.2 5  Now the liability of the third-party de-
fendant may be contingent ("is or may be liable"). The pertinent
section of the repealed statute 20 read "is or will be liable" and had
been held to mean that the party applying to the court to bring in
the third party must first show by affidavits that he had a clear and
absolute cause of action against the party sought to be impleaded.
2 7
The claim over must be related to the main action by a question
of law or fact common to both controversies, but need not rest upon
the same ground as the claim asserted in the main action.28 No
longer is identity of the primary claim and the claim over required.
Thus, if P sues D on causes of action X and Y, D may implead D2
on cause of action Z, if the other necessary conditions of the statute
are met. Prior to this enactment, New York courts had been strict
in requiring identity of claims. Their attitude is best exemplified
by the decision that impleader was improper where P sued D on
causes of action X and Y, and D sought to implead D2 on cause of
action X only.
29
The third-party defendant may answer the claim asserted
against him. In addition to his pleading against the third-party
plaintiff, the third-party defendant may in his answer assert against
the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the
plaintiff's claim.30 Here again the legislation has overruled prior de-
cisions, wherein it had been held that the impleaded party had no
right to answer a claim of the original plaintiff against the original
defendant.81
Service of the third-party defendant's answer is accomplished
by serving copies on the third-party plaintiff's attorney and the plain-
tiff's attorney within twenty days after the service of the summons
.and the third-party complaint.3 2 Serving the plaintiff's attorney with
a copy of the answer is a necessary requirement to the newly-given
right to interpose defenses against the primary claim, and the plain-
tiff is thus apprised of all defenses which have been made against
that primary claim.33 For the purpose of contesting the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party plaintiff, the third-party defendant shall
25 N. Y. CIV. PRAc. Act § 193 (3) prior to 1946 amendment.
26 Ibid.
2 7 Kromback v. Killian, 215 App. Div. 19, 213 N. Y. Supp. 138 (2d Dep't
1925).
28 i. Y. Civ. PRuc. AcT § 193-a (1).
29 Nichols v. Clark, MacMullen & Riley, Inc., 261 N. Y. 118, 184 N. E.
729 (1933).30 N . Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT § 193-a (2).
31 Municipal Service Real Estate Co., Inc. ,v. D. B. & M. Holding Corp.,
257 N. Y. 423, 178 N. E. 745 (1931); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 281 N. Y. 162, 22 N. E. (2d) 324




have the rights of a party adverse to the plaintiff, including the right
to appeal. 34
The plaintiff may amend his pleading to assert against the third-
party defendant any claim which he might have asserted against the
third-party defendant had he been joined originally as a defendant.3
Thus if the plaintiff has a claim against a third-party defendant as
to which he could have properly joined as co-defendants the third-
party defendant and the original defendant, he may assert that claim
despite his original failure to make the third-party defendant a co-
defendant. If the plaintiff does so amend his pleading, the third-
party defendant may assert a counterclaim against the plaintiff.30
The claims of all parties to the action shall be determined, and
such judgment or judgments as may be proper shall be rendered.37
But the stock arguments which have always been advanced to oppose
the liberalization of impleader have been recognized and provided
for. The controversy between the third-party plaintiff and the third-
party defendant may at times unreasonably delay determination of
the primary claim. Further, the trial of the two claims together
might result in prejudice to one of the parties, confusion, or undue
complication of issues. The court is therefore empowered to dis-
miss the third-party complaint without prejudice or order a separate
trial of the third-party claim where undue delay or prejudice may
result.38
Where a jury verdict for the plaintiff as to the primary claim
might be based on grounds which would not support the claim over
of the third-party plaintiff, the court, on motion of either the third-
party plaintiff or the third-party defendant, shall instruct the jury as
to the appropriate special findings necessary.3 9
The provision concerning impleader is not limited to the orig-
inal parties to the action. The third-party defendant may proceed
in turn against another not yet a party to the action who is or may
be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against
the third-party defendant.40
C. Intervention
"Intervention may be defined as the procedural device whereby
a stranger can present a claim or defense in a pending action or in
a proceeding incidental thereto, and become a party for the purpose
34 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 193-a (2).
35 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 193-a (3).
36 Ibid.
37 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 193-a (2).
38 N. Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 193-a (4).
39 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 193-a (5).
40 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 193-a (6).
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of the claim or defense presented." 41 In intervention the third party
initiates the procedural steps by which he is to become a party to an
action already commenced, and is thus distinguished from impleader,
wherein one of the parties to an action seeks to bring in the stranger.
The new intervention statute 42 is substantially similar to the
corresponding federal rule.43 The former statute 44 was available both
in actions formerly denominated legal or equitable4 5 but it was
severely limited in that it had been held not to be available in an
action for ai sum of money only.46 The remedy is now made ex-
pressly available in, but it is not limited to an action for a sum of
money only.47
Intervention is classified into two groups: 1. Intervention as of
absolute right; 48 2. intervention in the discretion of the court.49  In
the latter case, as in impleader, the court is to consider whether there
will be unreasonable delay, prejudice, or unjustified complication or
confusion of issues.
Intervention is permitted as of right: "(a) when a statute of
this state confers an absolute right to intervene; or (b) when the
representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may
be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment
in the action; or (c) when the applicant has an interest in real prop-
erty, the title to which may in any manner be affected by the judg-
ment, or in real property for injury to which the complaint demands
relief; or (d) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the cus-
tody of, or subject to the control of or disposition by, the court or
an officer thereof." 50
Intervention is permitted in the discretion of the court: (a) when
a statute confers a right to intervene in the discretion of the court;
or (b) when such applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. 51
Intervention is accomplished by serving a notice of motion to
intervene upon all parties who have appeared. 2 The notice shall'
contain a statement of the grounds of intervention and shall be ac-
412 MOOPE's FFD. PRAc. (1938) 2307.
42 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac § 193-b.
43 FED. R. Civ. P., 24.
44 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 193 (4) prior to 1946 amendment.
45 Rosenberg v. Salomon, 144 N. Y. 92, 38 N. E. 982 (1890).
46 Bauer v. Dewey, 166 N. Y. 402, 60 N. E. 30 (1901) ; Brooklyn Cooperage
Co. v. Sherman Lumber Co., 220 N. Y. 642, 115 N. E. 715 (1917).
47 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 193-b (1) (2).
48 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 193-b (1).49 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 193-b (2).50N. Y. Cxv. Pmac. Ac § 193-b (1).51 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Ac § 193-b (2).
52 N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Ac § 193-b (3).
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companied by a proposed pleading which is to set forth the claim
or defense for which the intervention is sought.
The present section on intervention is preferable to the previous
section which formerly required an "interest" in the "subject" of the
action. The present provision is more definite in its requirements
and will not be subject to conflicting interpretations as to whether
such interest must be "direct" or "indirect."
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion of the new amend-
ments that they will do much to clarify and facilitate methods of
procedure in the New York courts.
JOSEPH F. DOLAN.
DoMESTIc RELATIONS-ADULTERY AS A GRouND FOR SEPARA-
TION.-The Civil Practice Act has been amended to allow a spouse
to maintain an action for separation from bed and board on the
ground of an act of adultery of the other spouse.'
Prior to the amendment the innocent party was entitled to a
separation upon proving one of four grounds, to wit: abandonment,
conduct of the defendant rendering it unsafe or improper for plain-
tiff to continue to cohabit with the defendant, neglect or refusal of
the husband to support the wife and cruel and inhuman treatment.2
When adultery constituted legal cruelty it was cause for a judicial
separation. Thus it was held, ". . . if the adultery is open and
notorious, flaunted in the eyes of the public or dragged into the pres-
ence of the blameless wife or husband, two wrongs arise out of the
act: the adultery itself which is so gross an offense against the mar-
riage as in itself to lead to a dissolution of the marriage, and
cruelty. . . ." 3 Clandestine adultery was not sufficient justification
for the separation; 4 adultery in and of itself did not constitute cruel
and inhuman treatment.5 There was thus created the somewhat
anomalous situation that a wrongful act greater in degree could not
be the ground for relief lesser in extent. With the addition of sub-
I N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1161, amended by Ch. 774 of the Laws of 1947,
effective April 10, 1947.
2 Old N. Y. Civ. PPac. AcT § 1161.
3 Hofmann v. Hofmann, 232 N. Y. 216, 218, 133 N. E. 450, 451 (1921);
Jacobstein v. Jacobstein, 201 N. Y. Supp. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd without
opinion, 240 N. Y. 693, 148 N. E. 761 (1925); accord, Goldsmith v. Goldsmith,
151 Misc. 198, 199, 270 N. Y. Supp. 48, 49 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
4 Compare Hofmann v. Hofmann, 232 N. Y. 215, 133 N. E. 450 (1921),
with McKee v. McKee, 241 App. Div. 149, 271 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1st Dep't
1934).5 See Lanyon Detective Agency, Inc. v. Cochrane, 240 N. Y. 274, 278,
148 N. E. 520, 521 (1925).
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